Boosted to begin with by economists and demographers, Kerala
soon came in for praise from sociologists and political scientists. The former
argued that caste and class distinctions had radically diminished in Kerala
over the course of the 20th century; the latter showed that, when it came to
implementing the provisions of the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the
Constitution, Kerala was ahead of other states. More power had been devolved to
municipalities and panchayats than elsewhere in India.
Success, as John F. Kennedy famously remarked, has many fathers
(while failure is an orphan). When these achievements of the state of Kerala
became widely known, many groups rushed to claim their share of the credit. The
communists, who had been in power for long stretches, said it was their
economic radicalism that did it. Followers of Sri Narayana Guru (1855-1928)
said it was the egalitarianism promoted by that great social reformer which led
to much of what followed. Those still loyal to the royal houses of Travancore
and Cochin observed that when it came to education, and especially girls'
education, their Rulers were more progressive than Maharajas and Nawabs
elsewhere. The Christian community of Kerala also chipped in, noting that some
of the best schools, colleges, and hospitals were run by the Church. It was
left to that fine Australian historian of Kerala and India, Robin Jeffrey, to
critically analyse all these claims, and demonstrate in what order and what
magnitude they contributed. His book Politics,
Women and Wellbeing remains the definitive work on the
subject.
Such were the elements of the 'Kerala Model'. What did the
'Gujarat Model' that Narendra Modi began speaking of, c. 2007, comprise? Mr
Modi did not himself ever define it very precisely. But there is little doubt
that the coinage itself was inspired and provoked by what had preceded it. The
Gujarat Model would, Mr Modi was suggesting, be different from, and better
than, the Kerala Model. Among the noticeable weaknesses of the latter was that
it did not really encourage private enterprise. Marxist ideology and trade
union politics both inhibited this. On the other hand, the Vibrant Gujarat
Summits organized once every two years when Mr Modi was Chief Minister were
intended precisely to attract private investment.
This openness to private capital was, for Mr Modi's supporters,
undoubtedly the most attractive feature of what he was marketing as the
'Gujarat Model'. It was this that brought to him the support of big business,
and of small business as well, when he launched his campaign for Prime
Minister. Young professionals, disgusted by the cronyism and corruption of the
UPA regime, flocked to his support, seeing him as a modernizing Messiah who
would make India an economic powerhouse.
With the support of these groups, and many others, Narendra Modi
was elected Prime Minister in May 2014.
There were other aspects of the Gujarat Model that Narendra Modi
did not speak about, but which those who knew the state rather better than the
Titans of Indian industry were perfectly aware of. These included the
relegation of minorities (and particularly Muslims) to second-class status; the
centralization of power in the Chief Minister and the creation of a cult of
personality around him; attacks on the independence and autonomy of
universities; curbs on the freedom of the press; and, not least, a vengeful
attitude towards critics and political rivals.
These darker sides of the Gujarat Model were all played down in
Mr Modi's Prime Ministerial campaign. But in the six years since he has been in
power at the Centre, they have become starkly visible. The communalization of
politics and of popular discourse, the capturing of public institutions, the
intimidation of the press, the use of the police and investigating agencies to
harass opponents, and, perhaps above all, the deification of the Great Leader
by the party, the Cabinet, the Government, and the Godi Media -
these have characterized the Prime Ministerial tenure of Narendra Modi.
Meanwhile, the most widely advertised positive feature of the Gujarat Model
before 2014 has proved to be a dud. Far from being a free-market reformer,
Narendra Modi has demonstrated that he is an absolute statist in economic
matters. As an investment banker who once enthusiastically supported him
recently told me in disgust: "Narendra Modi is our most left-wing Prime
Minister ever - he is even more left-wing than Jawaharlal Nehru".
Which brings me back to the Kerala Model, which the Gujarat
Model sought to replace or supplant. Talked about a great deal in the 1980s and
1990s, in recent years, the term was not much heard in policy discourse any
more. It had fallen into disuse, presumably consigned to the dustbin of
history. The onset of COVID-19 has now thankfully rescued it, and indeed
brought it back to centre-stage. For in how it has confronted, tackled, and
tamed the COVID crisis, Kerala has once again showed itself to be a model for
India - and perhaps the world.
There has been some excellent reporting on how Kerala flattened the curve. It seems clear
that there is a deeper historical legacy behind the success of this state.
Because the people of Kerala are better educated, they have followed the
practices in their daily life least likely to allow community transmission.
Because they have such excellent health care, if people do test positive, they
can be treated promptly and adequately. Because caste and gender distinctions
are less extreme than elsewhere in India, access to health care and medical
information is less skewed. Because decentralization of power is embedded in
systems of governance, panchayat heads do not have to wait for a signal from a
Big Boss before deciding to act. There are two other features of Kerala's
political culture that have helped them in the present context; its top leaders
are generally more grounded and less imperious than elsewhere, and
bipartisanship comes more easily to the state's politicians.
The state of Kerala is by no means perfect. While there have
been no serious communal riots for many decades, in everyday life there is
still some amount of reserve in relations between Hindus, Christians and
Muslims. Casteism and patriarchy have been weakened, but by no means
eliminated. The intelligentsia still remain unreasonably suspicious of private
enterprise, which will hurt the state greatly in the post-COVID era, after
remittances from the Gulf have dried up.
For all their flaws, the state and people of Kerala have many
things to teach us, who live in the rest of India. We forgot about their
virtues in the past decade, but now these virtues are once more being
discussed, to both inspire and chastise us. The success of the state in the
past and in the present have rested on science, transparency, decentralization,
and social equality. These are, as it were, the four pillars of the Kerala
Model. On the other hand, the four pillars of the Gujarat Model are
superstition, secrecy, centralization, and communal bigotry. Give us the first
over the second, any day.
